Tag: city
Nuclear security lapses: It only takes one
by admin on Sep.10, 2009, under General, International Security Correspondent, Paula Newton, Terrorism
LONDON, England — In the late 1990s, getting permission to visit former Soviet nuclear sites was relatively easy and after to speaking to scientists still at work in them, the security was rather shocking. But what has alarmed me more over the years was realizing that North American and European research and academic facilities could do with a security audit themselves.
British regulators have routinely outlined security lapses and in the United States nuclear research labs have been penetrated with relative ease by nuclear safety campaigners posing as students. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has found that a radioactive source is lost or stolen in the United States almost every day.
In the words of President Barack Obama, "loose nuclear materials could exterminate any city on earth." So the effort to secure those materials needs to be a global one. The U.S.-led megaports system is a frontline defense for a non-proliferation strategy.
The program is seven years old and aims to equip 100 seaports by 2015 so that they can screen ship, rail and truck traffic through monitoring portals looking for radiological and nuclear material.
In one megaport in Antwerp, Belgium, port authorities say they are currently screening about 70 per cent of all traffic, 80 per cent of which ends up on North American soil.
"We seized 50 containers in 2008 with all kinds of nuclear and radioactive sources and that's all kinds of travel coming from all kinds of containers," says Noel Colpin, Director-General of Belgium’s Customs and Excise authority.
None of those incidents posed a serious terror threat but security officials say screening all container cargo is still a key goal.
"I think it’s very important because before we didn't know it, now we can do the screening and we are indeed surprised by the number of seizures and the importance," adds Colpin.
Since 2001, databases kept on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate roughly a doubling of illicit trafficking in materials that could be used in dirty bombs using radioactive material or in a few cases for nuclear devices.
One favoured route, through Russia, into Georgia and on to Turkey, means cargo gets an easy ride through to Europe and ports like this one in Belgium. While incidents involving weapons-grade nuclear material are rare, guarding against them is worth doing whatever it takes.
"It’s a game changer, it will change everything we take for granted for a very, very, long time. It’s lives lost, infrastructure damage, counting to billions, but you also have the political fallout, who knows what happens next," says Andreas Persbo, a nuclear researcher with Vertic.
Experts point out, we are still vulnerable, an IND, or Improvised Nuclear Device, could be shielded after being encased in lead and uranium and doesn’t even carry a signature.
"We’re not complete with our mission yet, and we have a ways to go to get to our ultimate goal which is protecting maritime traffic anywhere that it’s going," says William Kilmartin, a program director with the Megaports Program.
And what worries security authorities most is a tangible nexus between arms-dealers, organized crime and terrorists who would seek out insiders from state-sponsored nuclear weapons programs. It’s a deadly combination that experts say could slip through even the best of defenses.
Kabul’s enemy at the gates
by admin on Mar.11, 2009, under Afghanistan, International Security Correspondent, Paula Newton, Taliban
KABUL, Afghanistan — I knew something was wrong the minute I took a look at the police sniffer-dogs tasked with protecting a key checkpoint just outside the walls of the presidential palace. They looked tired, they weren’t interested in the cars, they had to be coaxed into sniffing around and they had sores on their hind legs. Great, I thought, that’s all that’s coming between me and a catastrophic explosion in Kabul: Work weary dogs and their underpaid masters.
Can you really blame the dogs or the cops though? Kabul is clogged with traffic and people and at the best of times there is no way to assure safety in this city. And it’s alarming for this correspondent to hear the same line from both the Taliban and one of the city’s top cops: Insurgents can hit the city anytime, anywhere.
That’s not to say the Kabul Police force isn’t trying. They are now talking about a double ring of security around the city and they’ve gotten better at enforcing it. Many cities around the world with many more resources, are having their own battle with terrorists and so in that context, the security forces here aren’t doing a bad job.
Securing this capital is a crucial test not only for the city’s police force, but for the whole country. They need to know they can stand on their own and sort out their own security without thousands of foreign troops turning their capital into a fortress.
Less than three years ago, foreigners could walk the streets of Kabul in relative safety and have the luxury and freedom to hail their own cabs and try out the local food. Some foreigners of course still do that, but the majority live in armed camps throughout the city, fearing both random attacks and targeted kidnappings.
I saw first hand the pictures from inside a recent attack on the Justice Ministry here. It was gruesome, stomach-churning stuff. The images of dead employees with bullets to the head and chest were bad enough, but the placid expressions of the dead Taliban fighters, some of whom had major body parts blow off, were chilling.
The Taliban claims it controls several of the main routes just outside the city and not many Afghans are willing to test that claim. Roadside bombs have tripled so far this year and then there are the “Taliban checkpoints” that are harrowing for Afghans, let alone foreigners.
The fact is, even if Kabul becomes more secure in the coming months it may remain virtually cut off from the rest of the country for some time. And then there’s still the issue of how to secure the city itself with a police force of grossly underpaid officers who claim they are on the take just to survive?
When I stopped at police headquarters at District #2, the commander there showed equal amounts of hubris and humility. Of course he said, he and his officers are heroes. But how else would you describe men who willingly walk the city knowing they could be target practice for the Taliban? And all for less than $200 a month.
I would like to hear what you think of the mission in Afghanistan. Let me know.
Lahore attack: were the gunmen planning a siege?
by admin on Mar.04, 2009, under Andrew Carey, International Security Producer, Pakistan, Terrorism
LONDON, England — Wednesday saw no dramatic developments in the investigation but instead witnessed a steady drip of reports and information about what happened and how.
Up to twenty people were arrested but none of the gunmen responsible for the attack were apparently among them.
Many have commented on the apparent ease with which the gunmen melted away into the city after the attack, and suggested this points to them receiving assistance from rogue elements within the military or the intelligence structure. While there may or may not have been collaboration of this kind, it’s a mistake to make this assumption on this piece of evidence alone.
It’s easy, for instance, to forget that the men who tried to bomb London on July 21st, 2005 were also able to make good their escape and hide undetected for days. Some of those men, remember, were escaping, unarmed, from busy underground railway stations. It was six days before the Met police had the first would-be bomber under arrest, and detectives in London had all the benefits of the city’s massive CCTV infrastructure at their disposal. Lahore, it seems safe to suggest, and notwithstanding the new video out Wednesday evening, is not quite so well endowed with surveillance cameras.
What’s more interesting is the number of reports now suggesting that the gunmen were carrying far more arms and ammunition than would be needed to execute an ambush only. Add to that the multiple reports they were also carrying dried fruit, nuts and water bottles in their rucksacks, and it does seem to point towards the possibility they had intended taking the Sri Lankan cricket team hostage. This possible scenario, of course, provides further similarities with the Mumbai attack three months ago.
Perhaps predictably, there have been growing voices blaming India for Tuesday’s attack. Hamid Gul, former head of Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, has described it as “all too obviously the handiwork of Indian intelligence.” Meanwhile, Pakistan’s serving Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, has said he does not “rule out a foreign hand.” Foreign hand is code for India, of course.
It’s not surprising that Pakistan’s government might wish to point the finger abroad. At home and around the world, it has been slammed over this security failure. Whether or not individual police officers did their duty on the day – and one can understand why suggestions they did not have hurt when six police were killed in the attack – it doesn’t seem unreasonable to suggest that the ruling party’s squabble with its political rivals might also have played a part in the failure.
Last month saw the dismissal of the provincial government in Punjab – of which Lahore is the capital – run by the party of Nawaz Sharif, the main nationwide opposition figure to President Asif Ali Zardari. Along with the outgoing administration, the most senior figures in the province’s police force were also removed from their jobs. Faced, then, with a major security challenge – policing an international cricket match – it seems some of the main men responsible were still getting their feet under their new desks.
