LONDON, England — In the late 1990s, getting permission to visit former Soviet nuclear sites was relatively easy and after to speaking to scientists still at work in them, the security was rather shocking. But what has alarmed me more over the years was realizing that North American and European research and academic facilities could do with a security audit themselves.

British regulators have routinely outlined security lapses and in the United States nuclear research labs have been penetrated with relative ease by nuclear safety campaigners posing as students. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has found that a radioactive source is lost or stolen in the United States almost every day.

In the words of President Barack Obama, "loose nuclear materials could exterminate any city on earth." So the effort to secure those materials needs to be a global one. The U.S.-led megaports system is a frontline defense for a non-proliferation strategy.

The program is seven years old and aims to equip 100 seaports by 2015 so that they can screen ship, rail and truck traffic through monitoring portals looking for radiological and nuclear material.

In one megaport in Antwerp, Belgium, port authorities say they are currently screening about 70 per cent of all traffic, 80 per cent of which ends up on North American soil.

"We seized 50 containers in 2008 with all kinds of nuclear and radioactive sources and that's all kinds of travel coming from all kinds of containers," says Noel Colpin, Director-General of Belgium’s Customs and Excise authority.

None of those incidents posed a serious terror threat but security officials say screening all container cargo is still a key goal.

"I think it’s very important because before we didn't know it, now we can do the screening and we are indeed surprised by the number of seizures and the importance," adds Colpin.

Since 2001, databases kept on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate roughly a doubling of illicit trafficking in materials that could be used in dirty bombs using radioactive material or in a few cases for nuclear devices.

One favoured route, through Russia, into Georgia and on to Turkey, means cargo gets an easy ride through to Europe and ports like this one in Belgium. While incidents involving weapons-grade nuclear material are rare, guarding against them is worth doing whatever it takes.

"It’s a game changer, it will change everything we take for granted for a very, very, long time. It’s lives lost, infrastructure damage, counting to billions, but you also have the political fallout, who knows what happens next," says Andreas Persbo, a nuclear researcher with Vertic.

Experts point out, we are still vulnerable, an IND, or Improvised Nuclear Device, could be shielded after being encased in lead and uranium and doesn’t even carry a signature.

"We’re not complete with our mission yet, and we have a ways to go to get to our ultimate goal which is protecting maritime traffic anywhere that it’s going," says William Kilmartin, a program director with the Megaports Program.

And what worries security authorities most is a tangible nexus between arms-dealers, organized crime and terrorists who would seek out insiders from state-sponsored nuclear weapons programs. It’s a deadly combination that experts say could slip through even the best of defenses.

After dozens of internal investigations, public statements and now two high-profile inquiries the conclusion hasn’t changed much: The July 7th terror attack in London could not have been prevented. 

For years now this has been a difficult theory to accept for victims and victims’ families. 

“It’s a matter of public safety and we can’t in all conscience walk away” says Rachel North who was injured on an underground train near Kings Cross station. 

Since late 2005,  North and dozens of other victims and their families have lobbied for a full judicial inquiry because they say they believe security authorities have not owned up to their mistakes.

“That’s not to blame people that’s to say I think now in 2009 if we don’t apply the thinking that we should have learned after 7/7, we’ll have another one” says North.

But according to the authors of the latest inquiry, the uncomfortable truth not just for victims and families but for the wider public, is that there is no guarantee another attack won’t happen, no matter what is done to improve the security architecture.

It is sobering to hear the government and others stress that the threat of attack is still severe.

Still, pulling apart the anatomy of this attack and the ensuing investigation is a useful exercise for any country. One of the key mistakes was British intelligence seemingly believing ‘it can’t happen here’.

Chris Driver Williams, a military explosives expert who was called in within minutes of the attack, says he was one of the first to suggest it was inspired by Al Qaeda and says when he voiced that during an emergency cabinet meeting, the notion was literally laughed off.

“I came out with a very early assessment that it was an Al Qaeda attack and was met with actually from one very senior intelligence figure at the time who couldn’t understand how I could come up with that assessment” says Driver-Williams.

Authorities not just in Britain, but around the world, have learned from that experience and are taking home grown terror very seriously. In particular, the security structure, how intelligence is gathered and analyzed, has been changed in Britain to ensure a more comprehensive approach to potential threats.

Driver-Williams believes that’s important because far from the ‘spectacular’ attack of 9/11, we are more likely to see future attacks model 7/7 and more recently, the Mumbai attacks in late 2008.

The investigations and inquiries post 7/7, as imperfect as they may seem to victims, have been valuable in dissecting the possible foundations for a home grown terror attack. And as that threat evolves, the British experience may prove more and more relevant in other countries.